The Moral Indefensibility of Some Western Political Perspectives in Relation to Confucian Philosophy
Western political philosophers often provide social, political and economic models based on western cultural influences. If too narrowly conceived, however, these perspectives can often be seen as morally indefensible when removed from western contexts or examined through non-western perspectives. In his recent work Contemporary Social and Political Philosophy, James P. Sterba provides his 'moral conclusion' that any legitimate social/political/economic system is one which satisfies the conditions of a basic-needs minimum for its citizens. In his view, "a basic-needs approach to specifying an acceptable minimum would guarantee people the goods and resources necessary to meet at least the normal costs of satisfying their basic needs in the society in which they live."[1] Furthermore, Sterba asserts that, in all cases, permanent coercive institutions (i.e., law enforcement agencies, armies, etc.) are required in order to sustain these systems.[2] However, it is questionable whether this stand is morally defensible in the case of Confucian philosophy. Indeed, I intend to show that, while Confucian philosophy may morally supports the notion of basic-needs minimums for the citizens, it does not necessarily endorse the need for permanent coercive institutions.
Sterba begins his line of reasoning by adopting the original position stance defended by John Rawls.[3] Essentially, the original position is one in which we make choices about the allocation of resources in society "as though we were [all] standing behind an imaginary 'veil of ignorance' with respect to most particular facts about ourselves [and each other] - anything that would bias our choice or stand in the way of unanimous agreement."[4] Not knowing whether we would occupy a position of advantage or disadvantage in society, we are able to be more fair in our allocation of social resources. Sterba continues from this position and analyses three common social distribution systems - maximin, utilitarian, and compromise views[5] - and shows that they are not sufficient to ensure the welfare of all when the original position is extended to include distant peoples and future generations. Instead, Sterba demonstrates that the proviso of a 'basic-needs minimum' is necessary to accomplish these goals because, "if not satisfied, lead to significant lacks and deficiencies with respect to a standard of mental and physical well-being."[6] He defines this notion of basic-needs as "a person's needs for food, shelter, medical care, protection, companionship, and self-development."[7] To achieve these ends, however, he insists upon the use of force, relative to the resistance encountered, in order to establish and enforce a correct redistribution of resources.
. . . when one considers the degree of redistribution that would be necessary to achieve a basic-needs minimum within our own society and in the world at large, it is hard to see how coercive institutions could be avoided. Of course, the degree to which coercive institutions would be required would depend on the level and type of opposition that existed to achieving a basic-needs minimum. Other things being equal, the greater the opposition to securing and maintaining such a social minimum, the greater the need for coercive institutions.[8]
He goes on to test his views against many diverse styles of western political thought and arrives at the conclusion that it remains morally defensible to require coercive institutions in all cases. It is from this reasoning he is able to assert that, from all viewpoints, it is morally defensible to apply the standard of a basic-needs minimum and that coercive institutions are required to sustain that standard. This may not be entirely true, however, as we investigate this assertion relative to Confucian ideals. In so doing, we may come to see that Sterba's assertion regarding coercive institutions are nothing more than assumptions and that there are other alternatives to his thesis.
To begin the analysis, we will need to form some understanding of the foundations of Confucianism as provided in the Analects. The difficulty in doing this, though, lies in translating Chinese ethical terms into English. This occurs, for instance, in the word jen which arises as a term of philosophical importance in the Analects. The most common translation of jen is "humaneness" or "benevolence,"[9] and should be seen as a representation of an innate quality of the human being brought into expression (i.e., in relationship, person to person). In his exposition of Confucian philosophy, Raymond Dawson clarifies this idea:
Basically jen means the manifestation of ideal human nature; and since Confucian ethics is concerned not so much with qualities of the mind and heart as with activities, and not so much with man in isolation as with man relating to his fellow human beings, so that man's virtues are social virtues manifested in the conduct of human relationships, then jen may be defined as dealing with other human beings as a man ideally should . . . [T]he simplest description of jen in the Analects is that given in the reply to the disciple Fan Ch'ih, 'to love others.'[10]
So the ideal nature, which human beings should strive to locate in themselves and express is 'to love others,' and the expression that that entails becomes the foundation for culture. This description of love, however, is not complete without some further qualifications. F. C. Hsu takes exception to the 'flippant' rendering of jen as 'love,' and contends that it must be seen as something more than simple individual 'psychic love.'
It is a cosmic principle called in Chinese 'the heart of Heaven and Earth,' that by which the Harmony of the universe manifests and pervades . . . in other words, it is Divine Love . . . [and] it is that towards which every human being strives, and having attained it is then [themselves] divine. Descending more to the human level, it is that which every goodness is included . . . all in all, Jen is something that is rooted above and within, an entity without which there can be no universe.[11]
The basic tenet of Confucian philosophy, then, lies in recognizing the cosmic principle of Divine Love as a pervasive universal energy, innate in all human beings, and to which all things, including human beings, owe their very existence.[12] Through the 'uncovering' and identification with this principle within oneself, as opposed to the simple adoption of it as a superficial outer behavior, individuals could achieve harmony between 'Heaven and Earth' within themselves and, as an extension, in society. In relation to social and political structures it follows for Confucius that a society can achieve harmony only if it is led by a virtuous person. This leader, having developed the expression of Divine Love, sets the 'tone' or 'example' for cultural development and does nothing that would bring harm to the citizens. We see this as the consequence in a major principle espoused by Confucius:
Tsze-Kung asked, saying, 'Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?' The Master said, 'Is not Reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.' (Analect 15:23)[13]
This rule of conduct, similar to the Golden Rule in western doctrines, gives us some idea of both the activity of relationship between all members of society as well as the activity of governance instituted in this political system. That is, the ruler would require that no hardship be imposed on the citizens that they would not accept upon themselves also. This, in many respects, mirrors the "original position" stance discussed by Sterba in his chapter on Welfare Liberalism.[14] In that instance, the participants in the original position determine a set of basic-needs minimums to which all would be assured, thus, securing basic necessities for themselves regardless of the outcome of their position in society. In direct relation to Sterba's principle of a basic-needs minimum, we find this assertion made by Confucius:
When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of. (Analect 8:13)[15]
The presence of poverty in a wealthy society, for Confucius, is something to be ashamed of and arises as a result of poor leadership. Poor leadership, in turn, is the direct result of a leader lacking virtue. We can see this position in a clearer light if we consider the following statements put forward by Confucius:
A disciple asked Confucius about government. Confucius said, 'See to it that there is enough food, enough arms, and the trust of the people in government.' (Analect 12:7)[16]
The disciple asked, 'Since they have a large population, what is there to add?' Confucius said, 'Enrich them.' (Analect 13:9)[17]
The well-known Confucian scholar, Mencius, also appears to support the notion of basic-needs minimum for the citizens.
At the same time I should also say it is wrong for a prince not to share his pleasures with his subjects. If you will find pleasure in your subject's pleasures, they will also find pleasure in yours. If you will sorrow with their sorrows, they will sorrow with yours. At no time has a man failed to become a real king if he found pleasure with all the world and if he sorrowed with all the world.[18]
We see the natural injunction towards the king was to ensure that the subjects, beginning with the most helpless, were able to enjoy the basic-needs required for survival. We see this idea repeated by Mencius throughout his conversations with various rulers:
When the people have more grain, more fish, and turtles than they can eat, and more timber than they can use, then in the support of their parents when alive and in the mourning of them when dead, they will be able to have no regrets over anything left undone. This is the first step along the Kingly way.[19]
We can conclude, then, that the values promoted by Confucius, and supported by Mencius, recognized a basic-needs minimum for all members of society, particularly those most unfortunate.[20] This is clearly in agreement with the first part of Sterba's claim.
The difference, however, that arises between this non-Western perspective and Sterba's final conclusion is in Sterba's assertion that a legitimate coercive institution is justified in order to maintain that basic-needs minimum. While it can be said that a Confucian state could certainly possess an army, the purpose of that army is what may be called into question. It appears true that Confucius was aware of the need to defend one's country against negative outside influences. However, it is also suggested in the Analects that he believed that the need for coercion, against the citizenry, might subside over time in the presence of a virtuous leader. That is, correct rule by the king would lead to correct behavior in their subjects. This can be noted if we look closely at the Analects.
Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, 'To govern means to rectify. If you lead on the people with correctness, who will dare not be correct?' (Analect 12:17)[21]
The need to develop a standard of truth in which the people can trust and be assured of appears to be part of establishing boundaries of correct behavior for all. Rectification, or the need to recognize the truth of a situation and to deal with it in those terms, is a necessity to identifying what true needs are. This seems to be one step toward eliminating the need for coercion - i.e. by placing the responsibility onto individuals for their own behavior. The result is clearly described for us further by Confucius.
The Master said, 'When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.' (Analect 13:6)[22]
Confucius has distinctly pointed out the need for correct and appropriate behavior by the ruler. This becomes a powerful tool when combined with the previous notion of reciprocity. The ruler establishes correct behavior and then practices this under the idea of reciprocity. In time, Confucius feels that this influence on society could eliminate the need for any form of coercive institution in society.
The Master said, 'If good men were to govern a country in succession for a hundred years, they would be able to transform the violently bad, and dispense with capital punishments.' (Analect 13:11)[23]
Like a parent who models good behavior to inculcate responsibility and self-governance in their children, it is the anchoring of virtue in a society, through the presence of a virtuous leader, that produces a responsible and self-governing citizenry. The need to "enforce orders" towards right behavior becomes redundant and wholly contradictory as the members of society, through good governance, naturally develop the expression of their own innate ideal natures - namely, Jen. Philip J. Ivanhoe describes, in detail, the true sense of a Confucian society:
In the well ordered state, society becomes the family, writ large. The king, as father to his people, must care for them and, as a proper parent, provide for them. The ruler must enrich his people - both materially and spiritually. The enlightened state is an extended family, providing for the needs of all its members while preserving a strict hierarchy in its structure. Most important of all, the enlightened state, like the ideal family, is permeated at every level with a deep concern for each of its members. The moral life is the life lived cultivating oneself for participation in this enlightened state. But the commitment is never one of enlightened self-interest; participation in such a society affords one the unique opportunity of fulfilling one's destiny as a human being. The relationships one enters into as a member of society are not restrictive; they are liberating and fulfilling.[24]
In this humane form of society, the need for coercive institutions could be, as Confucius asserts, abated within a century. The presence of jen in all facets of social and private life serves to limit the military's function to external conflicts, primarily defensive. It is obvious that Sterba has failed to consider what effects correct government might have on a nation. His western bias seems to be showing through in his assumption that any form of social justice will need to be enforced with coercive institutions.
We have seen, then, how Confucian ideology supports the standard of a basic-needs minimum in society. It is clear, however, that the same measuring stick would not necessarily support Sterba's justification for permanent coercive institutions to enforce those standards. Relative to the Confucian ideal, abandonment of this benevolent approach as observed in later philosophies, up to and including the present, would speak to the difficulties evidenced in establishing social and political systems free of the need for coercive institutions. Confucian philosophy would deny the need for permanent coercive institutions by recognizing that the expressions of jen, reciprocity, and rectification would eventually lead to harmonious social systems. Western governments, on the other hand, issue laws for its citizens under the threat of penalty in hopes that this imposed order will produce harmony. As a result, their approach demands coercive institutions in order to maintain them and, in light of Confucian thought, leads to a general resentment of the government and promotes dishonesty in the citizenry. Sterba aptly recognizes the opportunity in investigating non-western cultures in that, "sometimes, as in the case of American Indian culture, there will be important lessons to learn."[25] In the case of Confucian philosophy, we can see just how valuable these lessons might be and that the traditional exclusion of non-western perspectives in western educational institutions may turn out to be more costly than expected. Indeed, the cost may come in the failure of western governments and societies to recognize and uphold essential human qualities needed to prevent the collapse of their social, political and economic systems.
End
1 James P. Sterba, Contemporary Social and Political Philosophy. (Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California. 1995). p. 17.
2 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 110.
3 John A. Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Chapter 2.
4 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 12-13.
5 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 12-14. Sterba provides a detailed analysis of each viewpoint.
6 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 15.
7 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 15.
8 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 25.
9 Raymond Dawson, Confucius p. 37. Raymond Dawson points out the difficulty of rendering the translation: "For jen nobody has found an entirely satisfactory solution. Benevolence, love, altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, magnanimity, perfect virtue, goodness, human-heartedness, humaneness, humanity, and man-to-manness have all been used."
10 Dawson, p. 38-39.
11 F. C. Hsu, Confucianism. p. 62-63. (italics mine).
12 Hsu, p. 63. F. C. Hsu describes it in this way: "Love is a mighty vibration coming straight from the One, and only the very pure and very strong are capable of receiving and manifesting it."
13 James P. Sterba, Social and Political Philosophy: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives. (Wadsworth Publishing Company: Belmont, California. 1998). p. 46.
14 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 12-19.
15 Sterba, Social and Political. P. 43.
16 Dawson, p. 111.
17 Dawson, p. 65. Dawson qualifies Analect 13:9 with a further footnote on page 160: "Although Confucius thought a materialistic outlook on life to be petty and confusing, he nevertheless recognized the material element in social welfare and order."
18 James R. Ware, The Sayings of Mencius. (New York: Mentor Books, 1960). p. 54.
19 D. C. Lau, Mencius. (Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1970). p. 51.
20 Ware, p. 56. In Book 1, Part B, Section 5, we see Mencius emphasizing that King Wen would always ensure the welfare of the lowest four classes first.
21 Sterba, Social and Political. p. 44.
22 Sterba, Social and Political. p. 45.
23 Sterba, Social and Political. p. 45.
24 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990). p. 6-7.
25 Sterba, Contemporary Social. p. 104.
Work Cited
Dawson, Raymond. Confucius. London, England: Oxford University Press, 1981.
Hsu, F.C. Confucianism. Pondicherry, India: Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, 1966.
Ivanhoe, Philip J. Ethics in the Confucian Tradition. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990.
Lau, D. C. Mencius. Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1970.
Rawls, John A. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Sterba, James P. Contemporary Social and Political Philosophy. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995.
Sterba, James P. Social and Political Philosophy: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998.
Ware, James R. The Sayings of Mencius. New York: Mentor Books, 1960.